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Abstract
A critical concern in data-driven decision making is to build models whose out-
comes do not discriminate against some demographic groups, including gender,
ethnicity, or age. To ensure non-discrimination in learning tasks, knowledge of the
sensitive attributes is essential, while, in practice, these attributes may not be avail-
able due to legal and ethical requirements. To address this challenge, this paper
studies a model that protects the privacy of the individuals sensitive information
while also allowing it to learn non-discriminatory predictors. The method relies
on the notion of differential privacy and the use of Lagrangian duality to design
neural networks that can accommodate fairness constraints while guaranteeing the
privacy of sensitive attributes. The paper analyses the tension between accuracy,
privacy, and fairness and the experimental evaluation illustrates the benefits of the
proposed model on several prediction tasks.
1 Introduction
A number of socio-technical decisions, such as criminal assessment, landing, and hiring, are in-
creasingly being aided by machine learning systems. A critical concern is that the learned models
are prone to report outcomes that are discriminatory against some demographic group, including
gender, ethnicity, or age. These concerns have spurred the recent development of fairness defi-
nitions and algorithms for decision-making, focusing attention on the tradeoff between the model
accuracy and fairness.
To ensure non-discrimination in learning tasks, knowledge of the sensitive attributes is essential.
At the same time, legal and ethical requirements often prevent the use of this sensitive data. For
example, U.S. law prevents using racial identifiers in the development of models for consumer lend-
ing or credit scoring. Other requirements may be even more stringent, and prevent the collection
of protected user attributes, such as for the case of racial attributes in the E.U. General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR), or require protection of the consumer data privacy. In this scenario,
an important tension arise between (1) the demand for models to be non-discriminatory, (2) the re-
quirement for such model to use the protected attribute during training, and (3) the restriction on the
data or protected attributes that can be used. There is thus a need to provide learning models that
can both guarantee non discriminatory decisions and protect the privacy of the individuals’ sensitive
attributes.
To this end, this paper introduces a differential privacy framework to train deep learning models that
satisfy several group fairness notions, including equalized odds, accuracy parity, and demographic
parity [40, 22, 2], while providing privacy of the protected attributes. The key elements of the
framework can be summarized as follows:
1. The fairness requirement is captured by casting the learning task as a constrained optimiza-
tion problem. A Lagrangian dual approach is then applied to the learning task, dualizing
the fairness constraints using augmented Lagrangian terms [23].
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2. The privacy requirement is enforced by using a clipping approach on the primal and dual
steps and adding noise calibrated by the sensitivities of the constraint terms and their gra-
dients. The primal step only applies clipping on constraint gradients involving sensitive
attributes, and thus, does not have a major effect on the model accuracy.
3. The framework addresses the bias-variance trade-off of clipping by providing bounds on
the expected errors of constraint gradients and constraint violations. The clipping bounds
can then be calibrated by minimizing these upper bounds.
4. Finally, the framework generalizes to the important scenario where only a subset of the
individuals reports the sensitive attributes, i.e., when participants are given the choice of
releasing sensitive information.
The rest of the paper reviews the related work (Section 2), introduces the problem setting (Section 3),
discusses the fairness and privacy definitions adopted (Section 4), presents the proposed Private and
Fair Lagrangian Dual (PF-LD) framework (Sections 5, 6, and 7), its theoretical results (Sections 6.1
and 6.2), and its empirical evaluation on several prediction tasks (Section 8). The empirical results
show that, on selected benchmarks, PF-LD achieves an excellent trade-off among accuracy, privacy,
and fairness. It may represent a promising step towards a practical tool for privacy-preserving and
fair decision making.
2 Related Work
The line of works on algorithmic fairness can be categorized into three groups those adopting pre-
processing techniques to guarantee fairness [43, 15, 6], those developing modifying algorithms to
satisfy some fairness notion [11, 39, 38, 8, 34], and those using post-processing techniques [17, 21,
28, 27]. The interested reader is referred to [9] for a recent survey on algorithmic fairness. On the
differentially private deep learning front, there are two relevant lines of work. The first is based
on the seminal work of Abadi et al. [1], which derives a differential privacy version of stochastic
gradient descent (DP-SGD) and proposes a technique, called moment accountant to track detailed
information of the privacy loss incurred by a sequence of SGD steps [1]. This idea has been extended
and improved by a number of follow-up work [29, 36]. The second avoids using the iterative nature
of the optimization algorithms used to training deep learning models by exploiting a collection of
teacher models [35, 5] to train a privacy-preserving model.
While this literature is extensive, the topics of privacy and fairness have been study mostly in iso-
lation. A few exceptions are represented by the following work. The work by Dwork et. al [12] is
one of the earliest contribution linking fairness and differential privacy and shows that individual
fairness is a generalization of differential privacy. More recently, Cummings et. al [10] consider
the tradeoffs when considering differential privacy and equal opportunity, a notion of fairness that
restricts a classifier to produce equal true positive rates across different groups. The work claim
that there is no classifier that achieves (, 0)-differential privacy, satisfies equal opportunity, and has
accuracy better than a constant classifier. Ekstrand et. al [16] raise questions about the tradeoffs in-
volved between privacy and fairness and, finally, Jagielski et. al [24] shows two simple, yet effective
algorithms that satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy and equalized odds. Finally, a recent line of work
has also observed that private models may have a negative impact towards fairness. In particular,
Pujol et. al [37] shows that differential privacy could disproportionately affect some groups on sev-
eral Census resource allocation tasks. A similar observation was made by Bagdasaryan et. al [4] in
the context of private deep learning models trained using DP-SDG. The authors observed disparity
in performance across different sub-populations on several classification tasks.
It is also worth mentioning that in order to build a fair model it is necessary to collect a subset of
users with their sensitive information like their gender, races or ages. This poses a privacy risks on
fair models [24, 26]. To achieve a fair model without disclosing those sensitive attributes, ¡ozannar
et. al [33] have very recently developed a differential privacy mechanism in which the true sensitive
information is perturbed prior being applied to a fair learning model.
In contrast to the work discussed above, this paper, presents a Lagrangian dual method to enforce
several fairness constraints directly into the training cycle of a deep neural network and proposes a
differentially private and fair version of the learning algorithm.
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3 Problem Settings and Goals
The paper adopts boldface symbols to describe vectors (lowercase) and matrices (uppercase). Italic
symbols are used to denote scalars (lowercase) and random variables or data features (uppercase).
Notation ‖ · ‖ is used to denote the l2 norm.
The paper considers datasetsD consisting of n individual data points (Xi, Ai, Yi), with i∈ [n] drawn
i.i.d. from an unknown distribution. Therein, Xi∈X is a non-sensitive feature vector, Ai∈A, with
A = [m] (for some finite m) is a protected attribute, and Yi∈Y = {0, 1} is a binary label. The goal
is to learn a classifierMθ : X → Y , where θ is a vector of real-valued parameters, that ensures a
specified non-discriminatory notion with respect toAwhile guaranteeing the privacy of the sensitive
attribute A. The model quality is measured in terms of a nonnegative, and assumed differentiable,
loss function L : Y × Y → R+, and the problem is that of minimizing the empirical risk function:
min
θ
J(Mθ, D) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
L(Mθ(Xi), Yi). (L)
The paper focuses on learning general classifiers, such as neural networks, that satisfy group
fairness (as defined next) and protect the disclosure of the sensitive attributes using the notion of
differential privacy. Importantly, the paper assumes that the attributeA is not part of the model input
during inference. This is crucial in the application of interest to this work as the protected attributes
cannot be disclosed.
4 Preliminaries
This section reviews the fairness and privacy notion adopted in this work.
4.1 Fairness
The paper consider a classifierM satisfying some group fairness notion under a distribution over
(X,A, Y ) for the protected attribute A and focuses on three fairness notions:
• Demographic Parity: M’s predictions are statistically independent of the protected attribute A.
That is,
Pr[M(X)= yˆ | A=a]=Pr[M(X)= yˆ] ∀a ∈ A, yˆ ∈ Y,
which, since yˆ ∈ {0, 1}, can be expressed as
E[M(X) | A = a] = E[M(X)], ∀a ∈ A.
• Equalized odds:M’s predictions are conditionally independent of the protected attribute A given
the label Y . That is, for all a ∈ A, yˆ ∈ Y , and y ∈ Y:
Pr[M(X)= yˆ | A=a, Y =y]=Pr[M(X)= yˆ | Y =y].
or, equivalently, for all a ∈ A, y ∈ Y ,
E[M(X) | A=a, Y =y]=E[M(X) | Y =y].
• Accuracy parity: M’s miss-classification rate is conditionally independent of the protected at-
tribute:
Pr[M(X) 6= Y | A = a] = Pr[M(X) 6= Y ], ∀a ∈ A,
or equivalently,
E[L(M(X), Y ) | A=a]=E[L(M(X), Y )], ∀a ∈ A,
where L is the loss function to minimize in problem (L).
As noted by [3] and [18], several fairness notions, including those above, can be viewed as equality
constraints between the properties of each group with respect to the population. These constraints
can be expressed as:
Ez∼DPi [h(z)]− Ez∼DGi [h(z)] = 0 (1)
where, for i in some index set I, DPi is a subset of the dataset D, indicating the population term,
DGi is a subset of DPi , indicating the group term, and is obtained by accessing the protected at-
tributes A, the function h characterizes the model output under some fairness definition.
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Example 1 (Demographic parity). Demographic parity can be expressed as a set of |A| constraints,
with h(z)=Mθ(z) and, for each i∈A, the subsets indicating population terms are defined as:
DPi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D},
and the subsets indicating the group terms as:
DGi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D ∧A= i}.
Example 2 (Equalized odds). Equalized odds can be expressed as a set of 2|A| constraints, with
h(z)=Mθ(z), and for each choice of y ∈ {0, 1}, and i∈A, the subsets indicating population terms
are defined as:
DPi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D ∧ Y =y},
and the subsets indicating the group terms as:
DGi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D ∧ Y =y ∧A= i}.
Example 3 (Accuracy parity). Accuracy parity can be expressed as a set of |A| constraints, with
h(z) = Lθ(Mθ(z)), where L is the loss function defined in problem (L), and, for each i ∈ A, the
subsets indicating population terms are defined as:
DPi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D},
and the subsets indicating the group terms as:
DGi ={(X,Y ) | (X,A, Y )∈D ∧A= i}.
4.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [13] is a strong privacy notion used to quantify and bound the privacy loss
of an individual participation to a computation. While traditional DP protects the participation of an
individual to a dataset used in a computation, similarly to [24, 33], this work focuses on the instance
where the protection is restricted to the sensitive attributes only. A dataset D ∈ D = (X ×A×Y)
of size n can be described as a pair (DP , DS) where DP ∈ (X×Y)n describes the public attributes
and DS ∈An describes the sensitive attributes. The privacy goal is to guarantee that the output of
the learning model does not differ much when a single individual sensitive attribute is changed.
The action of changing a single attribute from a dataset DS , resulting in a new dataset D′S , defines
the notion of dataset adjacency. Two dataset DS and D′S ∈ An are said adjacent, denoted DS ∼
D′S , if they differ in at most a single entry (e.g., in one individual’s group membership).
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized mechanism M : D → R with domain D and
rangeR is (, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. attribute A, if, for any dataset DP ∈(X ×Y)n, any two
adjacent inputs DS , D′S∈An, and any subset of output responses R ⊆ R:
Pr[M(DP , DS) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr[M(DP , D′S) ∈ R] + δ.
When δ = 0 the algorithm is said to satisfy -differential privacy. Parameter  > 0 describes the
privacy loss of the algorithm, with values close to 0 denoting strong privacy, while parameter δ ∈
[0, 1] captures the probability of failure of the algorithm to satisfy -differential privacy. The global
sensitivity ∆f of a real-valued function f : D → Rk is defined as the maximum amount by which
f changes in two adjacent inputs D and D′: ∆f = maxD∼D′ ‖f(D) − f(D′)‖. In particular, the
Gaussian mechanism, defined by
M(D) = f(D) +N (0,∆2f σ2),
whereN (0,∆f σ2) is the Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and standard deviation ∆f σ2, satisfies
(, δ)-DP for δ> 45 exp(−(σ)2/2) and <1 [14].
5 Constrained Learning with Lagrangian Duality
When interpreted as constraints of the form (1), fairness properties can be explicitly imposed to
problem (L), resulting in a constrained empirical risk minimization problem. Solving this new prob-
lem, however, becomes challenging due to the presence of constraints. To address this challenge,
this work uses concepts borrowed from Lagrangian duality.
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Algorithm 1: Fair-Lagrangian Dual (F-LD)
input: D = (Xi, Ai, Yi)ni=1 : Training data;
α, s = (s1, s2, . . .) : step sizes.
λmax: Max multipliers value.
1 λ1,i ← 0 ∀i ∈ I
2 for epoch k = 1, 2, . . . T do
3 foreach Mini-batch B ⊆ D do
4 θ←θ − α∇θ
[
J(Mθ, BP )+λ>k |µ(BP ) -µ(BG)|
]
5 λk+1 ← λk + sk |µ(DP )− µ(DG)|
6 λk+1,i ← min(λmax, λk+1,i) ∀i ∈ I
Consider a set of |I| constraints of the form (1), and expressed succinctly as:
µ(DP )− µ(DG) = 0>, (2)
where µ(DP ) and µ(DG) are vectors containing elements µ(DPi) = Eˆz∼DPi [h(z)] and µ(DGi) =
Eˆz∼DGi [h(z)], respectively, for each i∈I. Notice that the constraints in µ(DP ) access public data
only, while the constraints in µ(DG) access also the sensitive data. The resulting learning task is
defined by the following optimization problem
argmin
θ
J(Mθ, DP ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
L(Mθ(Xi), Yi) (3a)
subject to µ(DP )− µ(DG) = 0>. (3b)
In Lagrangian relaxation, the problem constraints are relaxed into the objective function using
Lagrangian multipliers λi ≥ 0 associated to each of the |I| constraints and expressing the penalty
induced by violating them. When all the constraints are relaxed, the Lagrangian function becomes
Lλ(θ) = J(Mθ, DP ) + λ> |µ(DP )− µ(DG)| , (4)
where λ = (λ1, . . . , λ|I|) and the function | · |, used here to denote the element-wise operator (i.e,
|µ(DPi) − µ(DGi)| for i ∈ I), captures a quantification of the constraint violations, often used in
constraint programming [20].
Using a Lagrangian function, the optimization becomes
?
θ (λ) = LRλ = argmin
θ
Lλ(θ), (5)
that produces an approximation M ?
θ(λ)
of M ?
θ
. The Lagrangian dual finds the best Lagrangian
multipliers, i.e.,
?
λ= argmaxλ≥0 J(M ?θ(λ), DP ), (6)
to obtainM ?
θ(
?
λ)
, i.e., the strongest Lagrangian relaxation ofM. Learning this relaxation relies on
an iterative scheme that interleaves the learning of a number of Lagrangian relaxations (for various
multipliers) with a subgradient method to learn the best multipliers. The resulting method, called
Fair-Lagrangian Dual (F-LD) is sketched in Algorithm 1. Given the input dataset D, the optimizer
step size α > 0, and step sizes s, the Lagrangian multipliers are initialized in line 1. The training
is performed for a fixed number of T epochs. At each epoch k, the primal update step (lines 3 and
4) optimizes the model parameters θ using stochastic gradient descent over different mini-batches
B ⊆ D. The optimization step uses the current Lagrangian multipliers λk. Therein, BP and BG
indicate the population and group terms over a minibatch. After each epoch, the dual update step
(line 5), updates the value of the Lagrangian multipliers following to a dual ascent rule [7, 19]. The
multipliers values are thus restricted to a predefined upper bound λmax (line 6).
6 A Private and Fair LD Model
To ensure fairness, the primal (line 4) and dual (line 5) updates of Algorithm 1 involve terms to
compute the violations associated to constraints (3b). These terms rely on the attributes A, and
5
therefore, the resulting model leaks the sensitive information. To contrast this issue, this section
introduces an extension to F-LD, called Private and Fair Lagrangian Dual (PF-LD) method, that
guarantees both fairness and privacy. The idea is to render the computations of the primal and dual
update steps differentially private with respect to the sensitive attributes.
Private Primal Update
At each epoch k, the primal update (line 4 of Algorithm 1) computes the gradients over the loss
function Lλk(θ), which is composed of two terms (see Equation (4)). The first term, J(Mθ, DP ),
uses exclusively public information, while the second term, λ>|µ(DP )−µ(DG)| requires both the
public and sensitive group information. The computation of these gradients can be made differen-
tially private by the introduction of carefully calibrated Gaussian noise. The general concept, relies
on performing a differentially private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SDG) step [1]. In a nutshell,
DP-SDG computes the gradients for each data sample in a random mini-batch, clips their L2-norm,
computes the average, and adds noise to ensure privacy.
The result below bounds the global sensitivity ∆p of the sensitive term in the primal update, which
is needed to calibrate the noise necessary to guarantee privacy.
Theorem 1. Let ‖∇θh(z)‖≤Cp, for all z∈BGi , i∈I, and some Cp>0. The global sensitivity ∆p
of the gradients of the constraints violation∇θλ>|µ(BP )− µ(BG)| is
∆p ≤ 2Cpλ
max
mini∈I |BGi | − 1
. (7)
The above uses a clipping term, Cp, to control the maximal change of the gradients. Crucially, this is
non-limiting, as it can be enforced by clipping the gradient contribution ‖∇θh(z)‖ to Cp, similarly
to what done in DP-SDG.
Proof. Consider two neighboring datasetB andB′ differing in the membership to a protected group
of one participating sample z = (X,A, Y ). W.l.o.g., consider a sample z that changes membership
from group A = k1 to A′ = k2. Upon this change, there are exactly two groups (BGk1 and
BGk2 ) whose sizes are being affected. Namely, one group size increases while the other decrease.
Additionally notice that |BGi − B′Gi | ≤ 1 when i ∈ {k1, k2}. Additionally, notice that this change
does not impact the population terms BP and B′P . For i ∈ {k1, k2}, the gradient contributions of
the constraint violations associated to the group terms can be bound as:∥∥∇θλi |µ(BPi)− µ(BGi)| − ∇θλi ∣∣µ(B′Pi)− µ(B′Gi)∣∣∥∥ (8a)
=
∥∥∇θλi ∣∣µ(B′Gi)− µ(BGi)∣∣∥∥ (8b)
=λi
∥∥∥∇θEˆz∼B′Gi [h(z)]−∇θEˆz∼BGi [h(z)]∥∥∥ (8c)
=λi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∇θ 1|B′Gi |
∑
z∈B′Gi
h(z)−∇θ 1|BGi |
∑
z∈BGi
h(z)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (8d)
≤λi
∥∥∥∥∇θ 1|BGi | − 1h(z)
∥∥∥∥ (8e)
=
λi
|BGi | − 1
‖∇θh(z)‖ ≤ λiCp|BGi | − 1
(8f)
where equation (8b) follows from that BP = B′P (and thus µ(BPi) = µ(BP ′i )) and since the whole
expression is under a norm operator, equation (8c) from that λi ≥ 0 and from definition of the µ
terms, equation (8e) follows from the notion of adjacent datasets and that there is a single element
differing between BGi and B
′
Gi
, and, finally, equation (8f) follows from the theorem assumption.
Therefore, the global sensitivity of the gradient contributions of the constraint violations can be
bounded above as:
∆p = max
B,B′
∥∥∇θλ>|µ(BP )− µ(BG)| − ∇θλ>|µ(B′P )− µ(B′G)|∥∥ (9a)
≤
∑
i∈I
∥∥∇θλi|µ(BPi)− µ(BGi)| − ∇θλi|µ(B′Pi)− µ(B′Gi)|∥∥ (9b)
6
≤ Cpλk1|BGk1 | − 1
+
Cpλk2
|BGk2 | − 1
≤ 2Cpλ
max
mini∈I |BGi | − 1
. (9c)
where the last inequality follows from Equation (8), and noticing that (1) there are exactly two
groups BGi (i ∈ {k1, k2}) whose size is being affected, (2) for any i ∈ I, λi ≤ λmax and (3)|BGi | ≥ mini∈I |BGi |.
Using Theorem 1, the privacy-preserving primal update step for a mini-batchB⊆D can be executed
by clipping exclusively the gradients of the functions h(z) associated with the group terms in BG. It
is not necessary to perform gradient clipping for the functions h(z) associated with the population
terms in BP . While this may induce propagating population and group terms gradients of different
magnitudes, the authors observed often improved performance in the adopted setting. Thus, PF-LD
substitutes line 4 of Algorithm 1 with the following
θ ← θ − α(∇θ [J(Mθ, BP )] + λ> ∣∣∣∇θµ(BP )− ∇¯Cpθ µ(BG)∣∣∣+N (0, σ2p ∆2pI)), (10)
with I∈{0, 1}|I|×|I|, σp>0, and ∇¯Cpθ is applied to each element µ(BGi) of vector µ(BG), where
∇¯Cpθ (x)=
∇x
max(1, ‖∇x‖Cp )
denotes the gradients of a given scalar loss x clipped in a Cp-ball, for Cp > 0.
Private Dual Update
Similar to the primal step, the dual update requires access to the sensitive group information
(see line 5 of Algorithm 1). It updates the multipliers based on amount of constraint violation
|µ(DP )− µ(DG)| computed over the entire dataset D. Privacy can be attained by injecting Gaus-
sian noise to the computation of the multipliers, but computing the global sensitivity ∆d of the
constraint violations is non-trivial since the range of the violations is unbounded. Once again, the
paper recurs to the adoption of a clipping term, Cd, that controls the maximal contribution of the
constraint violation to the associated multiplier value.
Theorem 2. Let |h(z)| ≤ Cd, for all samples z ∈ DGi , i ∈ I, and some Cd > 0. The global
sensitivity ∆d of the constraint violation |µ(DP )− µ(DG)| is
∆d ≤
√
2Cd
mini∈I |DGi | − 1
. (11)
Proof. Consider two neighboring datasets D and D′ differing by the group membership of one
particular sample z. Using a similar argument as that used in the proof of Theorem 1, consider
a sample z that changes membership from group A = k1 to A′ = k2. Upon this change, there
are exactly two groups (BGk1 and BGk2 ) whose sizes are being affected. Namely, one group size
increases while the other decrease. Additionally notice that |BGi − B′Gi | ≤ 1 when i ∈ {k1, k2}.
Additionally, notice that this change does not impact the population terms BP and B′P .
The maximal amount of difference between the conditional empirical mean µ(DGi) constructed
from D and µ(D′Gi) constructed from D
′, for any given D,D′, can be bounded as
‖|µ(DP )− µ(DG)| − |µ(D′P )− µ(D′G)|‖ (12a)
≤
∑
i∈I
∥∥|µ(DPi)− µ(DGi)| − ∣∣µ(D′Pi)− µ(D′Gi)∣∣∥∥ (12b)
=
∑
i∈I
∥∥∣∣µ(D′Gi)− µ(DGi)∣∣∥∥ (12c)
=
∑
i∈I
∥∥∥∣∣∣Eˆz∼D′Gi [h(z)]− Eˆz∼DGi [h(z)]∣∣∣∣∣∣ (12d)
=
∑
i∈I
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|D′Gi |
∑
z∈D′Gi
h(z)− 1|DGi |
∑
z∈DGi
h(z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (12e)
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≤
∥∥∥∥∥ |h(z)||DGk1 | − 1 + |h(z)||DGk2 | − 1
∥∥∥∥∥ (12f)
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ Cd|DGk1 | − 1 + Cd|DGk2 | − 1
∥∥∥∥∥ (12g)
=
√√√√( Cd
|DGk1 | − 1
)2
+
(
Cd
|DGk2 | − 1
)2
(12h)
≤
√
2Cd
mini∈I |DGi − 1|
(12i)
where (12b) follows from triangle inequality, (12c) from that DPi = D
′
Pi
, for any i ∈ I (and thus
µ(BPi) = µ(BP ′i )) and since the whole expression is under a norm operator, (12d) and (12e) follow
by definition of the function µ. The inequality (12f) follows from that DGi and D
′
Gi
differ in at
most one element (when i = k1 or i = k2) and (12g), by assumption |h(z)| ≤ Cd, and, finally, (12i)
follows by noting that |DGi | ≥ mini∈I |DGi |.
The privacy-preserving dual update step, used in lieu of line 5 of Algorithm 1, is given by the
following
λk+1 ← λk + sk
(|µ(DP )− µ¯Cd(DG)|+N (0, σ2d∆2dI)) (13)
with I ∈ {0, 1}|I|×|I|, σd > 0, and where, for every i ∈ I,
µ¯Cd(DGi) = Eˆz∼DGi
[
h(z)
max(1, |h(z)|Cd )
]
.
Note that while Theorem 1 bounds the individual gradient norms of each functions h(z) for samples
z∈BGi and i∈I, Theorem 2 bounds their maximum absolute values. The choice of terms Cp and
Cd plays a special role in limiting the impact of an individual change in the protected attributes. It
controls, indirectly, the privacy loss, as it impacts the global sensitivities ∆p and ∆d. However, these
terms also affect the model accuracy and fairness. In particular, largerCp values will propagate more
precise gradients ensuring better accuracy and model fairness. On the other hand, larger clipping
values will also introduce more noise, and thus degrade the information propagated. The converse
is true for smaller clipping values. A theoretical and experimental analysis of the impact of these
terms to the model accuracy and fairness is provided in the next sections.
6.1 Privacy Analysis
The privacy analysis of PF-LD relies on the moment accountant for Sampled Gaussian (SG) mech-
anism [32], whose privacy is analyzed using Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP) [31].
Definition 2. [Sampled Gaussian Mechanism] Let f : S ⊆ D → Rd be a function mapping subsets
S of the input data D to Rd. The Sampled Gaussian (SG) mechanism with sampling rate 0 < q ≤ 1
and standard deviation σ > 0 is defined as follows:
SGq,σ(D) , f({x : x ∈ D is sampled with probability q}) +N (0, σ2I),
where each element of D is sampled independently at random without replacement with probability
q, and N (0, σ2I) is the spherical d-dimensional Gaussian noise with per-coordinate variance σ2.
Theorem 3. ((α, )-RDP) A randomized mechanism f : D → R with domain D and range R is
said to have -Re´nyi differential privacy of order α, or (α, )-RDP for short, if for any adjacent
D,D′ ∈ D it holds that
Dα(f(D) ‖ f(D′)) ≤ ,
where Dα(P ‖ Q) , 11−α logEx∼Q
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
is the Re´nyi divergence of order α between two
probability distributions P and Q.
The privacy analysis of the SG mechanism is described by the following Theorem from [32].
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Theorem 4. For a given function f : D → Rd, such that ||f(D)−f(D′)||2 ≤ 1 for any neighboring
databases D,D′, the SG mechanism SGq,σ with sampling ratio q and standard deviation σ satisfies
(α, )-RDP with:
 ≤ Dα
[N (0, σ2) ‖ (1− q)N (0, σ2) + qN (1, σ2)] (14a)
 ≤ Dα
[
(1− q)N (0, σ2) + qN (1, σ2) ‖ N (0, σ2)] . (14b)
The Re´nyi divergences appearing in Equations (14a) and (14b) can be computed numerically accord-
ing to the procedure described in [32]. Additionally, RDP enjoys composition: ifM1 andM2 are
mechanisms satisfying (α, 1)-RDP and (α, 2)-RDP, respectively, then their composition satisfies
(α, 1 + 2)-RDP [30]
The following results consider a PF-LD algorithm that trains a model over T epochs using a dataset
D containing n training samples, uses mini-batches B at each iteration, and standard deviation
parameters σp and σd, associated to the primal and dual steps, respectively. Note that, Equations
(10) and (13), correspond to instances of the SG mechanism.
Lemma 1. The PF-LD primal step satisfies (α, p)-RDP, where p satisfies Equations (14) with q=
|B|/n and σ = σp∆p are, respectively, the SG sampling ratio q and standard deviation parameters.
Proof. The result follows directly by Definition 2 and Theorems 3 and 4 since the primal step of
PF-LD uses Gaussian noise with parameter σp over a subsample of the dataset of size |B|.
Lemma 2. The PF-LD dual step satisfies (α, d)-RDP, where d satisfies Equations (14) with q=1
and σ=σd∆d are, respectively, the SG sampling ratio and standard deviation parameters.
Proof. The result follows directly by Definition 2 and Theorem 3 since the dual step of PF-LD uses
Gaussian noise with parameter σd.
PF-LD uses a predefined amount of noise (specified by parameters σp and σd) at each iteration, so
that each iteration has roughly the same privacy loss, and uses the moment accountant [1] to track
detailed information of the cumulative privacy loss.
Theorem 5. PF-LD satisfies (α, Tnp|B| + Td)-RDP.
Proof. The result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 and by the composability of RDP [30].
The final privacy loss in the (, δ)-differential privacy model is obtained by observing that a mecha-
nism satisfying (α, )-Re´nyi differential privacy also satisfies (+ log
1/δ
α−1 , δ)-differential privacy, for
any 0<δ<1 [30].
6.2 Bias-Variance Analysis
A key aspect of PF-LD is the choice of values Cd and Cp used to bound the functions h(z), and their
gradients, respectively, for every sample z ∈ DGi and i ∈ I. The choice of these clipping terms
affects the global sensitivity of the functions of interest, which, in turn, impacts the amount of noise
used by the differentially private mechanisms. As a result, the clipping terms are associated to a bias-
variance trade-off: Small values can discard significant amounts of constraints information, thus
introduce bias; large values retain more information but force the differential privacy mechanism
to introduce larger noise, inducing more variance. It is important to recall that, at every iteration,
PF-LD induces some privacy loss, thus, for a fixed privacy budget, the use of small values cannot
be compensated by longer runs. This section formulates a bias-variance analysis that is helpful to
select clipping values for gradient norms under the SG mechanism.
Let G=∇θλ>|µ(BP ) − µ(BG)| be the gradient computed over a minibatch B during the primal
update of F-LD (Algorithm 1 line 4) and G˜=λ>|∇θµ(BP )− ∇¯Cpθ µ(BG)|+N (0, σ2p∆2pI) be its
privacy-preserving counterpart, as computed by PF-LD (Equation (10)).
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Theorem 6. The expected error between the real and noisy gradients, G and G˜, incurred during
the primal step can be upper bounded as:
E
[∥∥G− G˜∥∥] ≤2√SG˜σpλmaxCp
mini∈I |BGi | − 1
+
∑
i∈I
λiEˆz∼BGi
[
max
(
0, ‖∇θh(z)‖ − Cp
)]
,
where SG˜ is the shape (i.e., the number of entries) of G˜.
Proof. By triangular inequality,
E
[
‖G− G˜‖
]
≤ E
[
‖G˜− E[G˜]‖
]
+ ‖E[G˜]−G‖
Where the first term of the right hand side inequality represents the variance term and the second is
the bias term. The squared variance term can be bounded as follows:(
E
[
‖G˜− E[G˜]‖
])2
≤ E
[
‖G˜− E[G˜]‖2
]
= SG˜σ
2
p∆
2
p. (15)
The above follows from Jensen inequality: For any convex function f , f(E[X]) ≤ E[f(X)], and
by setting f = (·)2 and X = ‖G˜ − E[G˜]‖, and from noticing that the term E
[
‖G˜− E[G˜]‖2
]
correspond to the variance of the Gaussian noise added to the each of the SG˜ model gradients (see
Equation (10)). Therefore E
[
‖G˜− E[G˜]‖
]
≤√SG˜σp∆p. The bias term can be bound as follows:∥∥∥E[G˜]−G∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∥∑
i∈I
λi
(
∇θ
∣∣µ(BPi)− ∇¯Cpθ µ(BGi)∣∣−∇θ∣∣µ(BPi)−∇θµ(BGi)∣∣)
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i∈I
λi
(
∇θµ(BGi)− ∇¯Cpθ µ(BGi)|
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
∑
i∈I
λi
∥∥∥Eˆz∼BGi [∇θh(z)]− Eˆz∼BGi [∇¯Cpθ h(z)]∥∥∥
≤
∑
i∈I
λiEˆz∼BGi
[∥∥∥∇θh(z)− ∇¯Cpθ h(z)∥∥∥] (by Jensen inequality)
=
∑
i∈I
λiEˆz∼BGi
[
max
(
0, ‖∇θh(z)‖ − Cp
)]
, (16)
where the last equality is due to gradient clipping.
Combining Equation (15) with Equation (16) and replacing the term ∆p with
2Cpλ
max
mini∈I |BGi |−1 (by
Theorem 1), gives the sought upper bound for the expected error of the private gradients.
Note that the bound above is a convex function of Cp. Its unique minimizer satisfies:
2
√
SG˜σpλ
max
mini∈I |BGi | − 1
=
∑
i∈I
λiEˆz∼BGi
[
1
[‖∇θh(z)‖ ≥ Cp]].
While beyond the scope of the this work, the above illustrates that a procedure to find the optimal
Cp privately can be constructed effectively.
Next, the paper shows how to bound the expected error incurred in using the noisy constraint vi-
olations during the dual step. Let Vi = |µ(DPi) − µ(DGi)| be the value corresponding to the i-th
constraint violation (i ∈ I), and V˜i= |µ(DPi)− µ¯Cd(DGi)|+N (0, σ2d∆2d) be its privacy-preserving
version (see Equation (13)).
Theorem 7. The expected absolute error between the real and noisy constraint violations Vi and
V˜i, for i∈I, is bounded by the following
E
[
|Vi − V˜i|
]
≤
√
2Cd σd
mini∈I |DGi | − 1
+ Eˆz∼DGi [max(0, |h(z)| − Cd)] .
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The proof uses similar arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 6
Proof. By triangular inequality,
E
[
|Vi − V˜i|
]
≤
∣∣∣Vi − E[V˜i]∣∣∣+ E [∣∣∣V˜i − E [V˜i]∣∣∣]
Where the first term of the right hand side inequality represents the variance term and the second is
the bias term.
Using the Jensen inequality, the squared variance term can be bound as follows:(
E
[
|V˜i − E[V˜i]|
])2
≤ E
[(
V˜i − E[V˜i]
)2]
= σ2d∆
2
d,
where the last equality holds because the noisy constraint violations are perturbed with Gaussian
random noise with a standard deviation σd∆d. By replacing ∆d =
√
2Cd
mini∈I |DGi | by Theorem 1, the
variance term now can thus be upper bounded by:
E
[
|V˜i − E[V˜i]|
]
≤
√
2Cd σd
mini∈I |DGi | − 1
. (17)
Next, focusing on the bias term, note that the true constraint Vi is represented as:
Vi = |µ(DPi)− µ(DGi)| =
∣∣∣Eˆz∼DPi [h(z)]− Eˆz∼DGi [h(z)]∣∣∣ , (18)
and the expectation of its private version, V˜i, can be written as
E
[
V˜i
]
=
∣∣∣∣∣Eˆz∼DPi [h(z))]− Eˆz∼DGi
[
h(z)
max(1, |h(z)|Cd )
]∣∣∣∣∣ (19)
where the above follows from the definition of the constraint on the group term µ¯Cd(DGi (see main
paper, equation after Equation (13)). Combining Equations (18) and (19), the bias term can be
rewritten as: ∣∣∣Vi − E[V˜i]∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣Eˆz∼DGi [h(z)]− Eˆz∼DGi
[
h(z)
max(1, |h(z)|Cd )
]∣∣∣∣∣
= Ez∼DGi [max(0, |h(z))| − Cd)|] . (20)
Combining Equation (20) and (17) provides the sought bound.
7 PF-LD: Handing Missing Values
This section presents a simple, yet important, extension to the PF-LD model where only a subset
of the individuals reports the value of the sensitive attributes. Recall that to build a fair model it is
necessary to collect sensitive information about users. While the privacy risks of this data collection
can be mitigated with the techniques proposed in this paper, a practical scenario may involve the
data curator to give the user a choice to whether release their sensitive information or not. This
section shows that it is straightforward to adapt the proposed model to this scenario.
The paper considers the case where only a fraction r ≤ 1 of the training samples presents the
sensitive attribute A. To operate under this scenario, it is sufficient to modify the sensitivity ∆p
of the gradients of the constraint violations (Equation (7)) and the sensitivity ∆d of the constraint
violations (Equation (11)) to, respectively, ∆′p = ∆p/r and ∆
′
d = ∆d/r. The argument follows from
the observation that reducing the number of training samples having sensitive data also reduces
the components mini∈I |BGi | (Equation (7)) and mini∈I |DGi | (Equation (11)) by a factor of r.
Consequentially, while on one side, using less information may affect the model ability to satisfy
the fairness constraint, on the other, it also require smaller amounts of noise to guarantee the same
level of privacy. This trade-off is subject of analytical study, presented next.
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Data # Samples # Features Y A |A| Protected group sizes (%)
Bank 11,162 15 Deposit Age 2 8% ; 92%
Income 45,222 50 ≥ 50K Gender 2 32% ; 68%
Compas 6,150 10 2 years recidivism Gender 2 20% ; 80%
M-Bank3 11,162 15 Deposit Age 3 8% ; 46% ; 46%
M-Bank5 11,162 15 Deposit Age 5 8% ; 23% ; 23% ; 23% ; 23%
Table 1: Dataset summary
8 Experimental Analysis
Datasets, Models, and Metrics This section studies the behavior of the proposed algorithm on
several datasets, including Income. Bank, and Compass [41] datasets, described as follows.
• Income: The task is to predict if an user has annual income above $50,000. The protected
attribute associated with the group membership is the gender, and there are two groups:
male and female.
• Compas: The task is to predict if a defendant will re-offend in the next two years (2 years
recidivism). The protected attribute associated with the group membership is gender.
• Bank: The task is to detect client subscriptions to the term deposit. The protected attribute
associated with the group membership is age and the experiments consider the following
three different group membership sizes:
– Bank, in which the number of protected groups |A| = 2, with the majority of the
people of age ranging from 25 to 60 and minority, being under 25 or over 60 years
old.
– M-Bank3, in which the number of protected groups is |A| = 3, indicating people with
age ranging from 25 to 40, 41 to 60 and the remaining ages.
– M-Bank5, in which the number of protected groups is |A| = 5, indicating people with
age ranging from 25 to 33, 34 to 40, 41 to 48, 49 to 60, and the remaining ages.
All datasets above were pre-processed according to [42, 41] and are so that all features have zero
mean and unit variance. A summary of the datasets adopted and their features is provided in Table 1.
The experiments consider a baseline classifier (CLF), implemented as a neural network with two
hidden layers, that maximize accuracy only, without considerations for fairness or privacy, and com-
pare the proposed PF-LD model against the following state-of-the-art algorithms: Z, it implements
a fair logistic regression models that achieves group fairness. These models were presented in [42]
for demographic parity and in [41] for accuracy parity and equalized odds. A, it implements the
fair logistic regression model based on reduction approaches. introduced in [2]. Note that the mod-
els above preserves group fairness but do not guarantee privacy. They are used to highlight the
effectiveness of the proposed approach based on the Lagrangian dual to ensure fairness. Finally,
M, proposed in [33], the model most related to the proposed work, ensures both fairness and -
differential privacy with respect to the sensitive attributes. The algorithm uses the fair model A on
perturbed noisy data generated according to a randomized response mechanism [25]. While these
models where studied in the context of equalized odds, this work extends them to satisfy all fairness
definitions considered in this work. Compared to the proposed model M has the disadvantage of
introducing large amounts of noise to the sensitive attribute, especially when the domain of these
attributes is large and/or when A is high-dimensional. 1
The experiments analyze the accuracy, fairness violations, and privacy losses (when applicable)
of the models above. The fairness violations are measured as the maximal difference in fairness
constraint violations between any two protected groups. The privacy losses are set to  = 1.0 and
δ = 10−5, unless otherwise specified. PF-LD uses clipping bound values Cp = 10.0 and Cd = 5.0.
1The authors note there is an additional work which addresses learning a fair and private classifier [24].
While an important contribution, it has been shown to induce significant privacy losses (see Figure 1 of [24]).
Model M was shown to outperform these algorithms presented in [24] in terms of classification error bounds.
Therefore, this paper adopts M, as the state-of-the-art.
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CLF Z A M DF-LP
Bank
Accuracy Parity acc 0.8 (0.007) 0.801 (0.005) 0.808 (0.004) 0.799 (0.007) 0.812 (0.004)fv 0.041 (0.021) 0.025 (0.015) 0.006 (0.004) 0.036 (0.019) 0.021 (0.009)
Demographic Parity acc 0.8 (0.007) 0.78 (0.009) 0.772 (0.01) 0.784 (0.008) 0.793 (0.013)fv 0.299 (0.034) 0.03 (0.021) 0.03 (0.017) 0.131 (0.048) 0.126 (0.027)
Equalized odds acc 0.8 (0.007) 0.791 (0.006) 0.764 (0.007) 0.796 (0.006) 0.808 (0.004)fv 0.239 (0.046) 0.113 (0.054) 0.125 (0.055) 0.252 (0.103) 0.188 (0.076)
Income
Accuracy Parity acc 0.848 (0.003) 0.848 (0.004) 0.834 (0.005) 0.842 (0.004) 0.782 (0.008)fv 0.114 (0.005) 0.114 (0.007) 0.093 (0.006) 0.11 (0.006) 0.061 (0.019)
Demographic Parity acc 0.848 (0.003) 0.827 (0.019) 0.789 (0.031) 0.792 (0.035) 0.799 (0.002)fv 0.181 (0.007) 0.039 (0.012) 0.044 (0.053) 0.063 (0.054) 0.019 (0.009)
Equalized odds acc 0.848 (0.003) 0.842 (0.003) 0.84 (0.003) 0.837 (0.002) 0.841 (0.003)fv 0.094 (0.013) 0.102 (0.022) 0.042 (0.005) 0.064 (0.014) 0.044 (0.006)
Compas
Accuracy Parity acc 0.683 (0.011) 0.677 (0.013) 0.675 (0.013) 0.661 (0.019) 0.671 (0.015)fv 0.024 (0.014) 0.016 (0.008) 0.033 (0.022) 0.016 (0.012) 0.031 (0.029)
Demographic Parity acc 0.683 (0.011) 0.634 (0.017) 0.643 (0.014) 0.664 (0.014) 0.667 (0.015)fv 0.121 (0.022) 0.023 (0.012) 0.048 (0.023) 0.092 (0.032) 0.098 (0.037)
Equalized odds acc 0.683 (0.011) 0.647 (0.011) 0.662 (0.019) 0.67 (0.013) 0.677 (0.015)fv 0.118 (0.038) 0.049 (0.033) 0.097 (0.044) 0.139 (0.036) 0.115 (0.04)
M-Bank3
Accuracy Parity acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.813 (0.005) 0.817 (0.009) 0.827 (0.007)fv 0.064 (0.021) NA 0.037 (0.012) 0.04 (0.032) 0.033 (0.007)
Demographic Parity acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.771 (0.008) 0.797 (0.006) 0.811 (0.008)fv 0.317 (0.035) NA 0.067 (0.026) 0.261 (0.085) 0.218 (0.033)
Equalized odds acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.783 (0.004) 0.808 (0.01) 0.825 (0.006)fv 0.244 (0.07) NA 0.199 (0.054) 0.348 (0.133) 0.279 (0.082)
M-Bank5
Accuracy Parity acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.809 (0.007) 0.814 (0.008) 0.827 (0.007)fv 0.078 (0.013) NA 0.055 (0.018) 0.059 (0.009) 0.046 (0.008)
Demographic Parity acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.757 (0.015) 0.774 (0.011) 0.805 (0.009)fv 0.341 (0.034) NA 0.091 (0.028) 0.336 (0.047) 0.193 (0.035)
Equalized odds acc 0.807 (0.008) NA 0.785 (0.011) 0.8 (0.008) 0.823 (0.007)fv 0.271 (0.068) NA 0.214 (0.045) 0.4 (0.117) 0.297 (0.084)
Table 2: Accuracy (acc) and fairness violation (fv) among all models and datasets. Models M and
DF-LP uses privacy budget  = 1.0. The results report the average value of a five fold cross
validation and its associated standard deviation (in parenthesis). Best accuracy or fairness violation
scores between M and DF-LP are highlighted in bold.
Architectures and Parameter Tuning Models PF-LD, M, and A all use a ReLU neural network with
two hidden layers. Thus these model have the same number of parameters to optimize.
The authors have not performed a systematic model tuning for the proposed PF-LD. Thus, they
suspect that the proposed model can achieve a higher accuracy, fairness, and privacy tradeoff that
that reported here, if the hyperparameters are tuned for specific benchmark and fairness definitions.
However, this is not the focus of this work.
8.1 Accuracy and Fairness
This section analyzes the impact on accuracy and fairness of the privacy-preserving models intro-
duced above. The main results are summarized in Table 2. Notice that the algorithm associated with
model Z only handles binary group data, and thus the table entries associated with the multi-group
experiments are left blank. For each dataset and fairness definition, the table reports the average
accuracy (acc) and fairness violation (fv) results and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of a five
fold cross validation. The results highlight in bold the best outcome, in terms of accuracy or fairness
violation, attained when comparing models M and DF-LP.
The table illustrates a clear trend: The proposed DF-LP is able to attain accuracy and fairness
violation scores that are comparable with those attained by the models that do not consider privacy,
and achieves a better accuracy-fairness tradeoff, when compared with M. Indeed, DF-LP achieves a
better accuracy or fairness scores in 90%(27/30) of cases. Additionally, while the fairness violation
scores achieved by model M are comparable with (or worse than) those attained by the basic classifier
on the multi protected attribute datasets, DF-LP is able to consistently reduce the model disparate
effects. This is due to that model M replies on an input perturbation mechanism to guarantee privacy.
However, the amount of noise required to guarantee privacy increases with the size of the protected
attribute domain.
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Figure 1: Privacy, fairness, and accuracy tradeoff on different datasets
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Figure 2: Effects of Cp to fairness and accuracy on the Bank (left) and Income(right) datasets
8.2 Privacy, Fairness, and Accuracy Tradeoff
This section illustrates the tradeoff between privacy, fairness, and accuracy attained by PF-LD and
compares them with algorithm M. The results are summarized in Figure 1, that depicts the average
and standard deviation of 10 model runs.
Firstly, observe that the fairness violation score decreases as the privacy budget  increases (note that
the scale differs across the plots). Large privacy losses allow PF-LD to either run more iterations,
given fixed noise values used at each iteration, or reduce the level of noise applied to a given number
of iterations. These cases imply propagating more (former case) or more accurate (latter case) noisy
constraint violations that results in better capturing the fairness constraints violations during the
primal and dual update steps. This aspect is not obvious for M.
Next, notice that the model accuracy slightly decreases as  increases. While this may seems sur-
prising, our analysis shows that the fairness constraints, having their violations being propagated
more exactly when  increase, have a negative impact on the model accuracy.
Finally, notice that, in most cases, PF-LD is more accurate and produce models that have smaller
fairness violations, and, importantly, it produces models that are more robust than those produced
by M. This is noticeable by comparing the standard deviations on accuracy and fairness violations of
the two models.
These observations demonstrates the practical benefits of the proposed model.
8.3 PF-LD: Analysis of the Primal Clipping Bound Value
This sections analyses the impact of primal clipping bound Cp to the privacy, accuracy, and fairness
tradeoff. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of Cp on the model accuracy and fairness, at varying of the
privacy parameter .
Observe that, for different fairness definitions, the best accuracy/fairness tradeoff is obtained when
Cp ∈ [10, 20] (green and yellow curves). The use of small clipping values (blue curve) slows the
drop in fairness violations at the increasing of the privacy budget . This is because small Cp values
limit the impact of the constraints violations to the model. On the other extreme, for high Cp values
(e.g., brown curve), not only it is observed a degradation in fairness violations, but also in the model
accuracy. This is because large Cp values imply larger amount of noise to be added to the gradient
of the constraint violations, resulting in less accurate information to be back-propagated at each
step. Additionally, the noisy constraints gradients can negatively impact the classifier loss function.
Thus, the resulting models tend to have worse accuracy/fairness tradeoff than those trained with
intermediate Cp values.
These observations support the theoretical analysis which showed that the expected error between
the true and private gradients of the fairness constraints is upper bounded by a convex function of
the primal and the dual clipping bounds.
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Figure 3: Individual gradient norms associated to a protected group and their relation to the clipping
values Cp. The figure illustrates the results associated with a model minimizing demographic parity
constraint violations on the Bank (left) and Income (right) datasets.
To further shed lights on the impacts of Cp to the model fairness and accuracy, Figure 3 illustrates
the model accuracy (left column of each sub-figure) the fairness violations (middle column of each
sub-figure) and the percentage of times the norm of the gradients associated to the constraint vi-
olations of a protected group exceeds the clipping value Cp: ‖G˜‖ > Cp% (right column of each
sub-figure). The last column on each sub-figure indicates the frequency of propagating the correct
or the clipped information. The figure uses demographic parity, but the results are consistent across
the other fairness metrics studied. Observe that, the percentage of individual constraint gradients
exceeding Cp is very high when Cp is small. Thus, a significant amount of information is lost due
to clipping. On the other extreme, at large Cp regimes most individual gradients (for both protected
groups) are smaller than Cp. This choice reduces bias, but it introduces large variances due to noise
necessary to preserve privacy. Therefore, both cases result in models that have large fairness viola-
tions. Conversely, at intermediate Cp regimes, the produced models have lower constraint violations
while retaining high accuracy.
8.4 PF-LD: Analysis of the Dual Clipping Bound Value
This sections analyses the impact of dual clipping value Cd to the privacy, accuracy, and fairness
tradeoff. Figure 4 shows one example of the impact of Cd to the model accuracy and fairness viola-
tions on Bank dataset. The results show a similar trend to what depicted for the for primal clipping
bound: In dual update using larger values Cd can introduce higher variance. In contrast, small val-
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ues can limit the amount of constraint violation being back propagated to update the multipliers λ.
Hence, the model bias may increase. A clear example of this case is illustrated in Figure 4. It showed
that using large values of Cd (e.g Cd = 100.0 (green curve) or Cd = 1000.0 (red curve)) introduce
large fluctuation to the model accuracy and fairness violation scores. In addition, large clipping
bounds Cd can deteriorate the model’s accuracy. Nevertheless, small clipping bounds Cd might not
reduce fairness violation at high privacy loss regimes. Therefore, intermediate clipping values sug-
gest better accuracy/fairness tradeoffs and, at the same time, do not introduce much variance to the
model performance.
0.795
0.800
0.805
0.810
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 p
ar
ity
 v
io
l.
0.76
0.78
0.80
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.1
0.2
0.3
De
m
og
ra
ph
ic 
pa
rit
y 
vi
ol
.
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
0.78
0.79
0.80
0.81
Ac
cu
ra
cy
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
Eq
ua
liz
ed
 o
dd
s v
io
l.
Cd = 0.001 Cd = 5.0 Cd = 100.0 Cd = 1000.0
Figure 4: Effects of Cd to fairness and accuracy on the Bank dataset.
8.5 Missing Values
The last experiments present results for the PF-LD model extension that handles the missing sensi-
tive information. The model is tested for cases when 60%, 40%, 20%, and no entry in the training
data misses the sensitive information. Missing values are not considered during the model evaluation
process to assess the model performance. Figure 5 depict the tradeoff among accuracy, fairness, and
privacy on Bank data using demographic parity as a fairness metric. It can be noted that the model
achieve smaller fairness violations as the number of missing values decreases. Similarly, the model
is better able to trade accuracy for fairness violations as the number of missing values decreases.
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Figure 5: PF-LD model with missing sensitive information on Bank data
9 Conclusions
This paper was motivated by the discrepancy between concerns in building models whose outcomes
do not discriminate against some demographic groups and the requirements that the sensitive at-
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tributes, which are essential to build these models, may not be available due to legal and ethical
requirements. It proposed a framework to train deep learning models that satisfy several notions of
group fairness, including equalized odds, accuracy parity, and demographic parity, while ensuring
that the model satisfies differential privacy for the protected attributes. The framework relies on
the use of Lagrangian duality to accommodate the fairness constraints and the paper showed how
to inject carefully calibrated noise to the primal and dual steps of the Lagrangian dual process to
guarantee privacy of the sensitive attributes. The paper further analyses the tension between accu-
racy, privacy, and fairness and an extensive experimental evaluation illustrates the benefits of the
proposed framework showing that it may be come a practical tool for privacy-preserving and fair
decision making.
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